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Abstract
We derive an estimating equation to estimate markups using the insight of Hall
(1986) and the control function approach of Olley and Pakes (1996). We rely on
our method to explore the relationship between markups and export behavior using
plant-level data. We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly higher markups when we control for unobserved
productivity shocks. Furthermore, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant higher markups for exporting
ﬁrms and present new evidence on markup-export status dynamics. More speciﬁcally,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ markups signiﬁcantly increase (decrease) after entering (exiting) ex-
port markets. We see these results as a ﬁrst step in opening up the productivity-export
black box, and provide a potential explanation for the big measured productivity pre-
mia for ﬁrms entering export markets.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Estimating markups has a long tradition in industrial organization and international trade.
Economists and policy makers are interested in measuring the eﬀect of various competition
and trade policies on market power, typically measured by markups. The empirical meth-
ods that were developed in empirical industrial organization often rely on the availability of
very detailed market-level data with information on prices, quantities sold, characteristics
of products and more recently supplemented with consumer-level attributes (Goldberg,
1995, Petrin, 2002 and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 2004). Often, both researchers and
government agencies cannot rely on such detailed data, but still need an assessment of
whether changes in the operating environment of ﬁrms had an impact on markups and
therefore on consumer surplus. In this paper, we derive a simple estimating equation in
the spirit of Hall (1986) and Levinsohn (1993) that nests various price setting models and
allows to estimate markups using standard plant-level production data.
The latest generation of models of international trade with heterogeneous producers
(e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) provide novel empirical predictions regarding the link
between markups and various ﬁrm-level characteristics, such as productivity, exporting
behavior, or sector level characteristics, such as market size or import shares. The link
between markups and exporting behavior is especially interesting given the well established
fact that exporters are more eﬃcient. Diﬀerences in pricing behavior between exporters
and non exporters could, at least partially, be responsible for this relationship. We use our
method to verify whether markups are diﬀerent for ﬁrms that are engaged in international
activities, exporting more speciﬁcally.1
Recent theoretical and empirical work in international economics has highlighted the
productivity premium for exporters. However, almost all empirical studies that relate
ﬁrm-level export status to (estimated) productivity rely on revenue to proxy for physical
output and therefore do not rule out that part of the export premium captures market
power eﬀects (De Loecker, 2007b). The relationship between export status and markups is,
however, less studied and understood. Our framework is especially well suited to address
this question since our method allows to control for unobserved productivity shocks which
is key in order to identify a separate markup for exporters. In addition, we study the
relationship between markups and changes in ﬁrm-level export status and provide new
evidence on how markups change as ﬁrms move into export markets.
We study the relationship between markups and export status for a rich panel of
1A few recent papers have provided similar evidence on importers (Halpern, Koren and Szeidl 2006;
Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; Lööf and Anderson, 2008). Our framework is also well suited to analyze
this relationship, but we do not observe import status at the ﬁrm level in this dataset, and therefore the
discussion lies beyond the scope of this paper.
2Slovenian ﬁrms over the period 1994-2000. Slovenia is a particularly useful setting for
this. First, the economy was a centrally planned region of former Yugoslavia until the
country became independent in 1991. A dramatic wave of reforms followed that reshaped
market structure in most industries. This implied a signiﬁcant reorientation of trade ﬂows
towards relatively higher income regions like the EU and led to a quadrupling of the
number of exporters over a 7 year period (1994-2000). Second, it has become a small
open economy that joined the European Union in 2004, and its GDP per capita is rapidly
converging towards the EU average. This opening to trade has triggered a process of exit
of the less productive ﬁrms, while deregulation and new opportunities facilitated the entry
of new ﬁrms.2
Our method delivers higher estimates of ﬁrm-level markups compared to standard
techniques that cannot directly control for unobserved productivity shocks. Our estimates
are robust to various price setting models and speciﬁcations of the production function.
We ﬁnd that markups diﬀer dramatically between exporters and non exporters and are
both statistically and economically signiﬁcantly higher for exporting ﬁrms. The latter is
consistent with the ﬁndings of productivity premia for exporters, but at the same time
requires a better understanding of what these (revenue based) productivity diﬀerences
exactly measure. We provide one important reason for ﬁnding higher measured revenue
productivity: higher markups. Finally, we ﬁnd that markups signiﬁcantly increase for ﬁrms
entering export markets. Again, this is in line with empirical evidence on the learning by
exporting eﬀect, but oﬀers at the very least a potential channel through which measured
productivity increases upon export entry.
Section 2 provides a brief overview on how production data has been used to recover
markups, and we discuss some of the problems with current methods. Section 3 introduces
our empirical model and shows how our approach is robust to various price setting models
and can be easily extended to allow for richer production technologies and various proxy
estimators that have been put forward in the literature. In section 4 we turn to the data
and discuss our main results. We conclude with some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Recovering markups from production data
Around twenty years ago, Robert Hall published a series of papers suggesting a simple way
to estimate (industry) markups based on an underlying model of ﬁrm behavior (Hall, 1986,
1988, 1990). These papers generated an entire literature that was essentially built upon
the key insight that industry speciﬁc markups can be uncovered from production data with
information on ﬁrm or industry level usage of inputs and total value of shipments (e.g.
2See De Loecker and Konings (2006) for more on the importance of entry in aggregate productivity
growth and De Loecker (2007a) for more on the export-productivity relationship.
3Domowitz et al., 1988; Waldmann, 1991; Morrison, 1992; Norrbin, 1993; Roeger, 1995
or Basu, 1997)3. This approach is based on a production function framework and allows
identifying a (constant) markup using the notion that under imperfect competition input
growth leads to disproportional output growth, as measured by the relevant markup.
An estimated markup higher than one would therefore immediately rejects the perfect
competitive model4.
However, some important econometric issues are still unaddressed in the series of
modiﬁed approaches. The main concern is that other factors that are not observed can
impact output growth as well. An obvious candidate in the framework of a production
function is productivity (growth). Not controlling for unobserved productivity shocks
biases the estimate of the markup as productivity is potentially correlated with the input
choice. The sign of the bias will depend on the correlation between the input growth and
productivity growth. This problem relates to another strand of the literature that stepped
away from looking for the right set of instruments to control for unobserved productivity.
Instead, a full behavioral model was introduced to solve for unobserved productivity as
a function of observed (ﬁrm-level) decisions, i.e. investment and input demand. Olley
and Pakes (1996) were the ﬁrst to propose a way to deal with unobserved productivity
and the endogeneity of inputs when estimating a production function5. The methodology
is now widespread in industrial organization, international trade, development economics
(see e.g. Van Biesebroeck, 2005 and De Loecker, 2007a who apply modiﬁed versions in
the context of sorting out the productivity gains upon export entry).
In this paper we take the approach suggested by Hall as given and focus on the un-
observed productivity shock within this framework and how it biases the estimate of a
industry wide markup.6 This problem became even more important due to increased
availability of ﬁrm or plant-level datasets that boosted empirical studies using some ver-
sion of the Hall approach on micro data (for instance Konings et al., 2005). This is opposed
to the use of industry-level data on which the original method relied. This further poses
the problem on how to deal with (ﬁrm-level) unobserved productivity in the context of
the basic Hall approach. Given the strong degree of ﬁrm-level productivity heterogene-
3The literature also spread to international trade. See Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Krishna and
Mitra (1998) and Konings and Vandebussche (2005).
4In the original model, Hall actualy tests a joint hypothesis of perfect competition and constant returns
to scale. However, in an extended version a returns to scale parameter is separately identiﬁed (Hall, 1990).
Importantly, our approach does not require any assumptions on the returns to scale in production as
opposed to the Roeger (1995) approach.
5Various reﬁnements have since been proposed in the literature (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg,
Caves and Frazier, 2007). However, Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes (2007) show that the basic
framework remains valid.
6In addition, there has been quite a long debate in the literature on what the estimated markup exactly
captures and how the model can be extended to allow for intermediate inputs and economies of scale among
others (see Domowitz et. al 1988 and Morrison 1992).
4ity (Bartelmans and Doms, 2002) the set of instruments suggested in the literature (i.e.
mostly aggregate demand factors such as military spending,oil price, or political party
of the president) appears inadequate. More recent microeconometric techniques, such as
GMM have been suggested as an alternative.
Here, we introduce the notion of a control function to control for unobserved produc-
tivity in the estimation of markups.7 We show that the Olley and Pakes (1996) and Hall
(1986) approach are linked in a straight forward way. In this way we identify markup para-
meters by controlling for unobserved productivity relying on clearly spelled out behavioral
assumptions. In addition, we identify markups without taking a stand on the exact timing
of inputs, adjustment costs of inputs (hiring and ﬁring costs for instance) since we only
need to include the control function (in investment, capital and potentially other inputs)
in a one-stage procedure. We show that this approach leads to a ﬂexible methodology and
reliable estimates. We also check whether our method is robust to recent developments
using proxy estimators to estimate production functions.
The empirical model is developed to verify whether exporters, on average, charge higher
markups than their counterparts in the same industry. A long list of empirical research
has investigated the link between export status and measured productivity. This evidence
has both generated and tested a new wave of theoretical models of international trade
with heterogeneous producers that started with Melitz (2003). Furthermore, we rely on
detailed export status information at the ﬁrm level to investigate whether markups change
when ﬁrms enter and exit export markets. This will allow us to open the black box of
reported learning by exporting and self-selection into exports ﬁndings.
3 A Framework to estimate markups
In this section we brieﬂy derive the estimating equation relating output growth to a
weighted average of input growth, allowing the identiﬁcation of a markup parameter. We
then provide a simple control function approach to control for unobserved productivity in
this context. Importantly, our main estimating equation is shown to be robust to various
price setting models such as Cournot and Bertrand. We brieﬂy describe how other proxy
estimators that have been put forward in the literature (such as Levinsohn and Petrin,
2003 and Ackerberg et. al, 2006) can be used in our framework.
7Note that all of this it relevant at the ﬁrm-level. Industry wide productivity shocks are controlled for
by the introduction of (a combination of) year dummies and time trends.
53.1 An underlying model of ﬁrm behavior
We derive a simple relationship between output growth and input growth which allows us
to identify markups from standard production data. The estimating equation is obtained
by i) considering a Taylor expansion of a general production function and ii) adding the
conditions from proﬁt maximization for ﬁrms that take input prices as given and compete
in either Nash in prices or quantities.
Let us start by considering a general production function f(.) that generates an output
Qit from using labor Lit, material inputs Mit and capital Kit and depends on the ﬁrm’s
productivity level Θit. The latter is an input neutral technology shock.
Qit = Θitf(Lit,M it,K it) (1)














and nothing behavioral was assumed.
In a second step, we can interpret the markup in a very ﬂexible way, i.e. under
various assumptions regarding the nature of competition in the industry. We consider this
ﬂexibility an important strength of the model, which can be important if we want to relate
as p e c i ﬁc theoretical model to the empirical methodology.
We now turn to some speciﬁc price setting models to show how we derive our main
estimating equation. We show our approach under the standard Cournot/Bertrand ho-
mogenous good model and brieﬂy discuss how we can easily extend it to richer settings.
Consider ﬁrms producing a homogeneous product and competing in quantities while
operating in an oligopolistic market where proﬁts πit are given by
πit = PtQit − witLit − mitMit − ritKit
where all ﬁrms take input prices (wit, mit and rit) as given. The optimal choice of labor













and analogous conditions apply for material and capital, where sit =
Qit
Qt is the market
share of ﬁrm i, ηt is the market elasticity of demand, and θit is equal to zero under perfect
competition, and equal to one if ﬁr m sp l a yN a s hi nq u a n t i t i e s ,r e s p e c t i v e l y .T h eo p t i m a l










6where MCit are the marginal cost of production and we deﬁne μit as the relevant ﬁrm
speciﬁc markup.
Now we follow Levinsohn (see also Shapiro, 1987 for a discussion of what the markup
measures) and use the optimal input choices for labor and materials (3) together with the














We now have to take one last step to recover a well known estimation equation suggested
by Hall (1986)8 by noticing that ∆Xit














= μit(αLit∆lit + αMit∆mit + αkit∆kit)+∆ωit (6)
where αLit, αMit and αKIt are the share of the relevant input’s costs in total revenue.
Intuitively, if ﬁrms set prices equal to marginal costs (μit =1 ) , the share of each input in
output growth is simply given by the relevant share in total revenue. We stress that the
input shares are assumed to be directly observed in the data, except for the capital share
αKit.
A similar expression can be obtained with a more general model of Bertrand competi-
tion (Nash in price) with diﬀerentiated products. The Lerner index, or price cost margin,



















∂pi (see e.g. Röller and Sickles, 2000).
The method could also be adapted to consider multiproduct ﬁrms (e.g. Berry, Levin-
sohn and Pakes, 1995)9 and to take into account pricing heterogeneity between ﬁrms, as
advocated by Klette and Griliches (1996), Klette (1999), and more recently by Foster,
8Hall (1986) obtains this estimating equation starting from the observation that the conventional mea-
sure of total factor productivity (TFP) growth is biased by a factor proportional to the markup under
the presence of imperfect competition. Note how our structural derived equation is exactly the same as
the one suggested by Hall (1986). The traditional way to estimate μit follows the instrumental variables
approach, the choice of which can easily be criticized. Roeger (1995) oﬀers an alternative method that
uses information from the primal and the dual Solow residual. This paper proposes another alternative
using the insight of Olley and Pakes (1996) on the estimation of production functions using a structural
model of industry dynamics.
9See Appendix A for an expression of markups within the context of our approach.
7Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) and De Loecker (2007b).10
In other words, the method is ﬂexible enough to consider various assumptions regarding
the nature of competition and accommodates two of the most common static model of
competition used by industrial economists. The markup can also reﬂect the result of
more complex dynamic games. What is important to note though, is that the estimated
parameter μ will clearly have a diﬀerent interpretation and will depend on elasticities in
various forms depending on the model we assumed. The extent of the bias of not controlling
appropriately for unobserved ﬁrm-level productivity shocks ultimately depends on the data
at hand. However, the sign of the bias is not straightforward to determine.
The Hall methodology and further reﬁnements by Roeger (1995) have become a pop-
ular tool to analyze how changes in the operating environment - such as privatization,
trade liberalization, labor market reforms - have impacted market power, measured by
the change in markups (Konings et al., 2005). Here again, the correlation between the
change in ’competition’ and productivity potentially biases the estimates of the change in
the markup. Let us take the case of trade liberalization. If opening up to trade impacts
ﬁrm-level productivity, as has been documented extensively in the literature, it is clear
that the change in the markup due to a change in a trade policy is not identiﬁed without
controlling for the productivity shock.11
3.2 Controlling for Unobserved Productivity Using a Control Function
Another strand of the literature focuses on the estimation of the coeﬃcients of a production
function. A standard Cobb-Douglas production is assumed to generate output Qit,a n d
in logs is given by
logQit = β0 + βL logLit + βK logKit +l o gΘit (7)
qit = β0 + βLlit + βKkit + ωit + εit (8)
The residual of the production function, or total factor productivity (logΘit), can be
decomposed as a productivity shock (ωit), which is correlated with inputs, and a i.i.d.term
(εit).
logΘit = ωit + εit (9)
10The recent model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), where ﬁrms compete in prices and products are
horizontally diﬀerentiated, generates a ﬁrm speciﬁc markup as a function of the diﬀerence between the
ﬁrm’s marginal cost and the average marginal cost in the industry. Therefore, when the ﬁrm is more
eﬃcient than its competitors, it charges an higher markup and enjoys higher proﬁts.
11T h es a m ei st r u ei nt h ec a s ew h e r ew ew a n tt oe s t i m ate the productivity response to a change in the
operating environment such as a trade liberalization. As output is usually proxied by sales the change in
markup and the productivity response are hard to separate without bringing more structure and data to
problem. See De Loecker (2007b) for more on this.
8To deal with this potential endogeneity, Olley and Pakes (1996) rely on a dynamic
model of investment with heterogeneous ﬁrms and generates an equilibrium investment
policy function which forms the basis of the estimation procedure, iit = it(ωit,k it).P r o -
vided that investment is a monotonic increasing function in productivity, we can proxy
the unobserved productivity shock by a function of iit and kit.
ωit = ht (iit,k it) (10)
Our approach simply relies on the insight Olley and Pakes (1996) to control for unob-
served productivity shocks in the markup regression, described in equation (5).
We provide two alternative approaches to correct for the unobserved productivity
shocks ∆ωit. Both approaches rely on the intuition behind the Olley and Pakes (1996)
methodology described above, and are used to shed light on the relationship between
export status and markups. The ﬁrst approach is directly built on the control function
approach suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996). The second approach relies speciﬁcally
on the (non parametric) Markov process of productivity shock and on ﬁrm exit. We also
discuss two alternative proxy estimators in the context of our approach.
Both approaches allow to estimate the markup using standard semi-parametric regres-
sion techniques as in Olley and Pakes (1996). It is important to note, however, that the
estimation of the markup is not aﬀected by the presence of non constant returns to scale.
As will become clear below, this is related to the fact that we do not need to observe
the user cost of capital (rit) which is very hard to come by.12 In terms of studying the
relationship between export status and markups, we take a very simple approach by sim-
ply interacting the markup term with various export status dummies. We will provide
more details when we discuss the results. In this way, we compare average markup diﬀer-
ences between exporters and non exporters, and further between various export categories
(starters, quitters and always exporters).
3.2.1 First approach: pure diﬀerence
As Olley and Pakes (1996) showed, we can proxy unobserved productivity by a function in
investment and capital. This implies that productivity growth ∆ωit is simply the diﬀerence
between the control function at time t and t − 1.
∆ωit = ht(iit,k it) − ht−1(iit−1,k it−1)
12We have to note that capital is a ﬁx e di n p u ta n daﬁrm might thus face a cost of adjustment. This will
slightly change the optimal input choice condition for capital. However, since we will collect the capital
terms in the control function, we do not have to specify the exact adjustment costs and the optimal capital
choice. It will imply that expression (5) will look diﬀerent. For notation purposes we stick to the original
expressions.
9and this will generate the following estimating equation for the markup parameter μ,
where we emphasize that we are only interested to estimate an average markup across a
given set of ﬁrms.
∆qit = μ[αLit∆lit + αMit∆mit + αKit∆kit]+ht(iit,k it) − ht−1(iit−1,k it−1)+∆εit
We collect all terms on capital and investment in an unknown function.
∆qit = μ∆xit + ∆φt(iit,k it)+∆εit
w h e r ew eu s et h ef o l l o w i n gn o t a t i o n ,
∆xit = αLit∆lit + αMit∆mit
∆φt(iit,k it)=μαKit∆kit + ht(iit,k it) − ht−1(iit−1,k it−1)
We note that some terms in the control function will drop out due collinearity that are
generated by the law of motion on capital, kt =( 1−δ)kt−1+it−1. In particular, under the
assumption that the capital stock depreciates at the same rate for all ﬁrms, investment
and capital at time t − 1 fully determine the capital stock at time t.13
This approach delivers an estimate for the markup (μ) by simply adding a non linear
function in capital and investment. It does, however, not explicitly control for the non
random exit of ﬁrms. Our second approach enables us to verify the impact on the estimated
markup of controlling for the selection process.
3.2.2 Second approach: selection control
Here we rely on one of the crucial assumption in Olley and Pakes (1996), namely produc-
tivity follows a ﬁrst order Markov process, where ξit denotes the news term in the Markov
process. We explicitly rely on the notion that the growth rate of output and the various
inputs is only available for surviving ﬁrms. This implies that productivity growth ∆ωit at
time t can be written as
∆ωit = ωit − ωit−1 = g(ωit−1,P it) − ωit−1 + ξit (11)
= g(h(iit−1,k it−1),P it)+ξit (12)
= g(iit−1,k it−1,P it)+ξit (13)
where Pit is the survival probability at time t − 1 to next year t. Empirically, we obtain
an estimate for this survival probability by running a probit regression of survival on a
13This will depend on the availability of investment data and whether it needs to be constructed from
capital stock data and depreciations.
10polynomial in investment and capital. The second step uses the result from the inversion
ωit−1 = ht(iit−1,k it−1),a n dt h eﬁnal step simply collects all observables in function g(.).
We now have the following estimating equation for our model.
∆qit = μ∆xit + e φt (iit−1,k it−1,P it)+∆ε∗
it (14)
where again we have that
e φt (iit−1,k it−1,P it)=μαKit∆kit + gt(ht (iit−1,k it−1),P it) (15)
∆ε∗
it = ∆εit + ξit
The capital stock at t no longer appears, as we know from the law of motion that capital
investment and capital fully determine the next period’s capital stock, i.e. kit =( 1−
δ)kit−1 + iit−1. In order to estimate the markup in this speciﬁcation we need one extra
step. The current speciﬁcation would lead to a biased estimator for the markup since
E(∆xitξit) 6=0 ,s i n c e
E(litξit) 6=0
E(mitξit) 6=0
This is exactly what causes the simultaneity bias when estimating a production func-
tion since ωit = g(ωit−1,ωit)+ξit. This clearly shows that the labor decision depends on
current productivity and therefore reacts to the news term in the productivity Markov
process. However, given the assumption that labor and materials are essentially freely




and estimate the markup (μ) consistently using equation (14).
3.3 Returns to Scale and the User Cost of Capital
Before we turn to alternative proxy estimators we want to stress that the use of the control
function has two major advantages in addition to correcting for unobserved productivity






and assume constant returns to scale in order to estimate the
markup parameter. The standard Hall approach for instance had to rely on constant
returns to scale to step away from the heroic task of measuring a ﬁrm-level user cost of
11capital rit.14 In order to relax the returns to scale assumption researchers had to take a
stand on the user cost of capital which has proven to be a very diﬃcult job. The con-
stant returns to scale assumption is also key in the approach of Roeger (1995) in order to
eliminate unobserved productivity shocks using the primal and dual representation of the
model, in addition to needing a measure for rit as well.
The use of the control function in our simple approach collects all the terms depending
on capital and investment and does not require any assumption on the returns to scale
and the user cost of capital. Obviously, these advantages do not come without any other
assumptions. It is clear that we are able to eliminate them by relying on the result that
we can proxy for unobserved productivity shocks using a non parametric function in the
ﬁrm’s state variables, in this case capital and investment. But as we will show below, we
can accommodate more state variables and therefore relax some of the assumptions that
the original Olley and Pakes (1996) framework rely on.
3.4 Alternative Proxy Estimators
In this section we brieﬂy discuss the use of other proxy estimators that have been intro-
duced in the literature building on the insight of Olley and Pakes (1996). In turn we
discuss the LP and the ACF proxy estimators in the context of our interest in estimating
markups. We show how our estimator suggested in approach 1 can be extended to allow
for diﬀerent proxy variables and additional state variables.
3.4.1 Intermediate input proxy estimator
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest the use of intermediate inputs instead of investment
as
mit = mit(ωit,k it) (16)
Therefore, this function can be inverted and ωit can be written as a function of mit
and kit:
ωit = hit (mit,k it) (17)
The rest of the estimation therefore proceeds in a similar way. However, the control
function will now include capital at t as there is still independent variation in capital
between time t and t − 1 a si n v e s t m e n ti sn o tu s e da sap r o x yi nL P .T h er e a s o nf o rt h i s
is that here no longer investment but intermediate inputs are used (together with capital)
to proxy for unobserved productivity shocks.
∆qit = μitαLit∆lit + ∆φt(mit,k it)+∆εit (18)
14See Hall (1990) however, as already noted in footnote 4, who suggested a simple way to jointly estimate
the returns to scale parameter and the markup.
12where
∆φt(mit,k it)=μ(αMit∆mit + αKit∆kit)+ht(mit,k it) − ht−1(mit−1,k it−1) (19)
However, one has to be careful with using this proxy estimator especially in the context
of our setup. Here we are explicit about the notion of competition in the output market, i.e.
we allow for imperfect competition. As it turns out this has implications for the validity
of the LP estimator. Essentially, the LP estimator relies on the inversion of the material
demand function - just as OP - which assumes perfect competition in the output market.
Therefore more assumptions are needed to still allow for the monotonic relationship of
material inputs in productivity conditional on the capital stock. Essentially, we have to
assume that more productive ﬁrms do not set disproportionately higher markups. See De
Loecker (2007b) for a detailed discussion on this.
3.4.2 A more ﬂexible approach
A recent paper by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazier (2006) discusses the underlying data
generating processes of two popular proxy estimators for production functions, OP and
LP. They show that the suggested framework can be generalized to allow for more ﬂexible
production technologies and timing assumptions of the inputs of the production process.
We refer to Ackerberg et. al for a detailed discussion of their methodology. For our
purpose, it is suﬃcient to note that the OP method delivers a consistent estimate of the
freely chosen variables under a plausible DGP. However, in this section we brieﬂys h o w
that one can relax these by using the argument raised in ACF: include all inputs into the
non parametric function φ(.) in a ﬁrst stage and use the relevant timing assumptions in the
second stage to estimate the parameters of interest. Remember that, in our setup, a crucial
diﬀerence is that the input shares (input elasticities) are computed from data rather than
estimates that we wish to obtain. However, if we believe that, for instance, labor cannot
be hired without adjustment costs and similarly for intermediate inputs, therefore lagged
labor and materials constitute additional state variables of the ﬁrm’s problem. Essentially
our model then looks like follows
∆qit = ∆φt (iit,k it,l it,m it)+∆ε∗
it (20)
where ∆φt (iit,k it,l it,m it)=μ(αLit∆lit + αMit∆mit + αKit∆kit)+ht(iit,k it,l it,m it) −
ht−1(iit−1,k it−1,l it−1,m it−1) and the markup parameter is not identiﬁed in a ﬁrst stage.
As in ACF the ﬁrst stage gets rid of all i.i.d. shocks, like measurement error. Our second
stage, however, only requires one moment condition to identify μ.15
15Interestingly, we can rely on several moments and test our model for overidentifying restrictions when
considering several instruments Zit in E(∆ε
∗
itZit)=0 .
13It is immediate that when ﬁrms do not face adjustment costs for material inputs, we
can estimate the markup in a ﬁrst stage as the coeﬃcient on αM∆mit. Again, a crucial step
here is that productivity follows a Markov process and therefore we have a diﬀerent policy
function for investment and hence a diﬀerent control function for unobserved productivity.
Formally, we have the following investment function iit = it(kit,ωit,l it), and therefore can
rely on ωit = ht(iit,k it,l it) as a proxy for unobserved productivity. This implies that the
control function for productivity growth will include labor at t and t − 1.
∆qit = μαMit∆mit + ∆φt(iit,k it,l it)+∆ε∗
it (21)
In fact, this is often a reasonable assumption we can take to the data: ﬁrms face
hiring/ﬁring costs for employees but can freely adjust their demand for intermediate inputs.
We will estimate this speciﬁcation and compare it to our general framework. It should
lead to the same estimate of the markup. This section shows the ﬂexibility of our approach
to include additional state variables that should help control for unobserved productivity
shocks. For instance, in the context of ﬁrms in international trade the export status could
serve as an important additional state variable to take into account.
3.5 Identifying markups for exporters
We are interested in the diﬀerence of average markups across exporters and non exporters,
and how new exporters’ markups react to entering foreign markets. To answer this, we
simply interact the input growth term ∆xit with a ﬁrm-time speciﬁc export status variable.
We will further explain our empirical model in detail, once we have introduced the data,
and discuss the information we can rely on.
4 Background and Data
We estimate our main estimating equation and various reﬁnements to shed light on 2 ques-
tions. First, we verify whether exporters consistently charge diﬀerent markups compared
to domestic producers. In order to separately identify the markup for domestic producers
and exporters, we need to control for unobserved productivity due to the strong correla-
tion between export status and productivity. In addition input growth and productivity
growth are known to be correlated, and this is often referred to as the simultaneity bias
when estimating production function. Secondly, we explore the link between markups and
the dynamics of ﬁrm-level export status. To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to provide
robust econometric evidence of this relationship.
We rely on a unique dataset covering all ﬁrms of at least 10 employees active in
14Slovenian manufacturing during the period 1994-2000.16 The data are provided by the
Slovenian Central Statistical Oﬃce and contains the full company accounts for an unbal-
anced panel of 7,915 ﬁrms.17 We also observe market entry and exit, as well as detailed
information on ﬁrm level export status. At every point in time, we know whether the ﬁrm
is a domestic producer, an export entrant, an export quitter or a continuing exporter.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics about the industrial dynamics in our sample.
While the annual average exit rate is around 3 percent, entry rates are very high, especially
at the beginning of the period. This reﬂects new opportunities that were exploited after
transition started.
Table 1: Firm Turnover and Exporting in Slovenian Manufacturing
Year Nr of ﬁrms Exit rate Entry rate #Exporters Labor Productivity
1995 3820 3.32 13.14 1738 14.71
1996 4152 2.60 5.44 1901 16.45
1997 4339 3.43 4.47 1906 18.22
1998 4447 3.94 4.14 2003 18.81
1999 4695 3.26 3.30 2192 21.02
2000 4906 2.69 3.38 2335 21.26
Labor Productivity is expressed in thousands of Tolars.
Our summary statistics show labor productivity increased dramatically, consistent with
the image of a Slovenian economy undergoing successful restructuring. At the same time,
the number of exporters grew by 35 percent, taking up a larger share of total manufacturing
both in total number of ﬁrms, as in total sales and total employment.
We use the detailed information on export status to shed some light on markup dif-
ferences between exporters and domestic producers. We study the relationship between
exports and markups since exports have gained dramatic importance in Slovenian man-
ufacturing. We observe a 42 percent increase in total exports of manufacturing products
over the sample period 1994-2000. Furthermore, entry and exit has reshaped market struc-
ture in most industries. Both the entry of more productive ﬁrms and the increased export
participation was responsible for signiﬁcant productivity improvements in aggregate (mea-
sured) productivity (De Loecker and Konings, 2006 and De Loecker, 2007a). Therefore,
we want to analyze the impact of the increased participation in international markets on
the ﬁrms’ ability to charge prices above marginal cost.
16We refer to De Loecker and Konings (2006) and De Loecker (2007a) for more details on the Slovenian
data.
17The unit of observation is an establishment (plant) level, but we refer to it as a ﬁrm.
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We report our main results and discuss how our method provides substantially diﬀerent
markup estimates. We brieﬂy discuss the importance of our suggested control function
approach to answer important policy questions in the context of export entry.
Table 2 collects our main ﬁndings. We estimate the markup under various speciﬁca-
tions: 1) the standard Hall approach, 2) various versions of our control function approach.
For the latter we consider 4 diﬀerent speciﬁcations: Control Function I simply introduces
the control for productivity growth as introduced in section 2.5. Furthermore, we show
the estimates using a second approach (Control Function II ) where we estimate the model
without and with the selection correction. Finally, we estimate the markup allowing for
adjustment cost in labor (Control Function III) which boils down to an ACF approach to
correct for productivity (section 3.2).
Table 2: Markups in Slovenian Manufacturing
Speciﬁcation Estimated Markup Standard Error
Standard Hall 1.03* 0.004
Control Function I 1.11* 0.007
Control Function II 1.13* 0.006
Control Function II including Selection 1.11* 0.007
Control Function III (labor state) 1.14* 0.008
Exporters versus Domestic Producers
Standard Hall
average markup 1.0279* 0.006
exporter eﬀect 0.0155 0.010
Control Function I
average markup 1.0543* 0.009
exporter eﬀect 0.1263* 0.013
All regressions include time and industry dummies.
A robust ﬁnding is that the estimated markup is higher when we rely on the control
function to proxy for unobserved productivity growth and the non random exit of ﬁrms.
The interpretation of this ﬁnding is that input growth is negatively correlated with pro-
ductivity growth. Firms that are experiencing positive productivity shocks can rely on
the same (or less) inputs to produce more output.18 This is consistent with the transition
18We have to note that our approach is subject to the same concern as the estimation of production
function where deﬂated revenue is used to proxy for output. However, in our context unobserved growth
in prices needs to be correlated with input growth, otherwise it will not aﬀect our markup estimates. De
16process where ﬁrms scaled down employment after long periods of labor hoarding, as well
as the entry of de novo ﬁr m sw h oe n t e ra tam u c hs m a l l e rs c a l e .
In the lower panel we verify whether exporting ﬁrms (on average) have higher markups
(given that exporters tend to produce at lower marginal costs) and compare our results
with the standard Hall approach.19 In order to estimate the markup for exporters we
extend our main estimating equation and interact the relevant term, ∆xit,w i t ha ne x p o r t e r
dummy EXPit.
∆qit = μD∆xit + μE∆xitEXPit + δEEXPit + ∆φt(iit,k it)+∆εit
When we use the standard Hall speciﬁcation, we cannot ﬁnd signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
markups for exporting ﬁrms20. On the contrary, our approach is better suited to an-
alyze markups diﬀerences between exporters and non-exporters, since we can explicitly
control for the export-productivity correlation in addition to the standard input growth-
productivity growth correlation. Both correlations need to be controlled for in order
to estimate a markup for domestic producers and exporters consistently. Indeed, when
we control for unobserved productivity shocks, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant higher markup for
exporters. This result has important policy implications, as the well documented produc-
tivity premium of exporters could be, at least partly, a consequence of pricing diﬀerences.
We tested whether exporters’ (average) markup are diﬀerent in the domestic (μE,D)





it are the share of domestic and foreign sales in total sales, respectively.
We ﬁnd only a slightly lower domestic markup (0.126), but not statistically diﬀerent from
the foreign market’s markup (0.132). In fact, using the ﬁrm speciﬁcs h a r e s ,t h ea v e r a g e
total export markup parameter is 0.131, compared to 0.1263 in Table 2.21
These results are consistent with the well established empirical fact that exporters are
more productive. In the case of Slovenia, De Loecker (2007a) ﬁnds signiﬁcant productivity
diﬀerences between exporters and domestic producers. In addition, he ﬁnds that export
entry further leads to productivity gains - often referred to as learning by exporting - in
addition to the more productive ﬁrms self selecting into export markets. In the context
Loecker (2007b) shows that this is mostly severe for obtaining reliable measures for productivity. The
coeﬃcients on the inputs do hardly change when controlling for unobserved prices and demand shocks.
Jaumaundreu and Mairesse (2006) document similar ﬁndings using Spanish manufacturing data.
19All the coeﬃcients are robust to considering ﬁrms with positive investment only and thefore the
diﬀerence between the uncorrected and corrected estimates are not driven by speciﬁcs a m p l eo fﬁrms. In
Appendix B we report the estimated markups for the various industries.
20A few papers analyzed this relationship using the Roeger method (Görg and Warzynski, 2003; Bellone
et al., 2007), ﬁnding an export premium in markups as well. This paper provides a novel and more ﬂexible
methodology.
21This test rests on an implicit assumption that the share of domestic (export) sales in total sales are
the correct weights, and implies that inputs are used proportional to sales. Without more detailed data
on inputs by product or market, it is an open question how strong this assumption is.
17of our model it is clear that, if we do not control for unobserved productivity shocks, the
estimated interaction eﬀect of export status and input growth - and therefore markups for
exporters - is biased.22
So far we have just estimated diﬀerences in average markups for exporters and do-
mestic producers. Our dataset also allows us to test whether markups diﬀer signiﬁcantly
within the group of exporters. It is especially of interest to see whether there is a speciﬁc
pattern of markups for ﬁrms that enter export markets, i.e. before and after they become
an exporter. This will help us to better interpret the results from a large body of em-
pirical work documenting productivity gains for new exporters. These results are used to
conﬁrm theories of self-selection of more productive ﬁrms into export markets as in Melitz
(2003) or learning by exporting. We now turn our attention to the various categories of
exporters that we are able to identify in our sample: starters, quitters and ﬁrms that
export throughout the sample period. To capture the relationship between how markups
change as a ﬁrm enters or exits an export market, we run a similar regression interacting
the markup with a ﬁrm-time speciﬁc export status variable, deﬁned as a set of dummies,
statusit,a sf o l l o w s
∆qit = μ∆xit + statusit ∗ ∆xit + ∆φt(iit,k it)+∆εit (22)
statusit =( μs,bBst
it + μs,aAst





In equation (22) Bst
it is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm starts exporting (we call these
ﬁrms ‘starters’) during our period of analysis, say at time tStart
0 , and the observation takes
p l a c eb e f o r ei ts t a r t se x p o r t i n g( t<t Start
0 ), and equal to 0 otherwise; Ast
it is equal to 1
if the ﬁrm starts exporting and we observe it after it started exporting (t ≥ tStart
0 ), and
equal to 0 otherwise; ALit i se q u a lt o1i ft h eﬁrm is always exporting during our period
of analysis, and 0 otherwise; B
q
it is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm stopped exporting during the
period (we refer to these ﬁrms as ‘quitters’), but is observed while it was still an exporter,
and equal to 0 otherwise; A
q
it is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm stopped exporting and is observed
after it stopped exporting, and equal to 0 otherwise. The default category consists of ﬁrms
producing only for the domestic market.
Table 3 shows the results and we clearly see that ﬁr m sw h i c ha r ea l w a y se x p o r t i n g
have a larger markup than ﬁrms that sell only on the domestic market, consistent with
the evidence reported above.
A new set of results emerges in the rows two to six. Firms entering export markets
have a larger markup even before they start exporting than their domestic counterparts.
22In the case where export status is a state variable in the underlying model we cannot identify the
interaction term in a ﬁr s ts t a g e . T h i sw o u l di m p l yt h a te x p o r ts t a t u si sp a r to ft h en o np a r a m e t r i c
function φ(.). For a discussion on this see De Loecker (2007a).
18Table 3: Markups and export dynamics (Control Function)
Coeﬃcient s.e.
Baseline (domestic) 1.04* 0.012
Starters Before Entering 0.08** 0.033
After Entering 0.15* 0.021
Always exporters 0.14* 0.020
Stopper Before Exiting 0.03 0.020
After Exiting -0.11* 0.030
Regression includes industry and year dummies in addition to separate dummy variables.
The latter is consistent with the self-selection hypothesis whereby more eﬃcient ﬁrms ﬁnd
it productive to pay the ﬁxed cost of entering an export market. Here more eﬃcient can
mean that a domestic ﬁrm might simply produce at a higher cost while charging the same
price.
Interestingly, markups increase very substantially, on average, after export entry and
the average markup increases to a level slightly above the markup of ﬁrms that continue
exporting. The diﬀerence, however, is not signiﬁcant.
For ﬁrms that stop exporting, their markup did not deviate from the level of non-
exporting ﬁrms when they were still exporting, but after they stop exporting, the markup
drops dramatically.23 Figure 1 in Appendix A shows this evolution graphically. It is
important to note that these patterns are not found when we do not control for unobserved
productivity shocks, in fact markups are either insigniﬁcant or much lower in magnitude.
The latter shows again the importance of controlling for the correlation between export
status and productivity shocks.
It is striking to see that the markup-export patterns are identical to the productivity-
export patterns found in De Loecker (2007a). He ﬁnds that productivity increases upon
export entry and that exporters are more productive than their domestic counterparts.
These results are suggestive of changes in performance of new exporters due to higher
markups. Bringing this evidence together with the robust (revenue) productivity premia,
at the very least requires a deeper investigation of what these measured productivity
gains for exporters are suppose to capture. In addition, our evidence suggests that the
gap between the notion of (physical) productivity in theoretical models like Melitz (2003)
and the empirical measurement of productivity is an important one, i.e. markups are
diﬀerent for exporters and they change as ﬁrms switch status. We leave this for further
research.
Finally, given our framework, we can back out estimates for productivity growth after
23This could suggest that these ﬁrms were exporting poor quality products to Eastern European coun-
tries.
19we estimated the markup parameter.24 H o w e v e r ,n o ww eh a v et ot a k eas t a n do nt h e
returns to scale - or implicitly on the user cost of capital - under which ﬁrms produce.25
It is clear from equation (5) that we can only compute implied productivity growth after
imputing values for αKit. Let us return to the main estimating equation before introducing
the use of the control function and consider productivity growth
∆qit − b μ(αLit∆lit + αMit∆mit +( λit − αLit − αMit)∆kit)= d ∆ωit (23)
We rely on our estimates of the markup b μ and impose various values for the returns
to scale parameter λit. We consider three diﬀerent cases where λit will take values of 1,
1.1 and 0.9 or constant, increasing and decreasing returns to scale. In this way we can
compare the productivity growth estimates between the uncorrected approach (column I)
and our control function approach (column II) under the three diﬀerent cases. It is clear
that using standard techniques will lead to biased estimates for productivity growth since
they are based on downward biased markup estimates. Within the context of sorting out
markup diﬀerences between exporters and domestic producers, the uncorrected approach
would actually predict no diﬀerences in productivity growth, conditional on input use,
between the two, which is clearly in contradiction with empirical evidence. Table 4 shows
implied productivity growth under the various scenarios for both approaches.
Table 4: Implied Productivity Growth (Annual Averages in percentages)
CRS IRS DRS
II III III I
A ) M a n u f a c t u r i n g 3 . 5 22 . 1 63 . 0 11 . 5 84 . 0 32 . 7 5
B) Industry (weighted) 3.21 1.57 2.77 1.03 3.73 2.11
C) Manufacturing (status) 3.52 2.45 3.01 1.87 4.03 3.07
I is standard model without correction, II is control function approach.
We report productivity growth as simple average across all ﬁrms in Slovenian manu-
facturing (A), as an average of industry speciﬁc sales weighted productivity (B) and as an
average obtained from regression (22) averaged over all ﬁrms (C). The various comparisons
in table 4 clearly show that productivity growth is overestimated without controlling for
endogeneity of inputs and markup diﬀerences (column I). Indeed, productivity growth is
roughly only half of what we obtain when we ignore these two eﬀects (column II). The
bias is not speciﬁc to the returns to scale we assume, however, the implied productivity
estimates do depend on the values for λ.
24This is ruled out when relying on the Roeger (1995) method.
25Note that we do not have to make any assumptions on returns to scale when estimating the markup
parameter.
20The last row shows productivity growth under our speciﬁcation (22) where we allow
for markups to change with a change in a ﬁrm’s export status. These eﬀects are not
present when we do not control for unobserved productivity shocks, and therefore the
productivity growth estimates are exactly the same as in row (A). Although, our method
is not intended to directly provide estimates for productivity growth, we see this as an
important cross validation of the estimated markup parameters. Our estimates suggest
average annual productivity growth rates for Slovenian manufacturing between 3 and 1.5
percent.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper investigates the link between markups and exporting behavior. We ﬁnd that
markups diﬀer between exporters and non exporters. In order to analyze this relationship
we propose a simple and ﬂexible methodology to estimate markups building on the seminal
paper by Hall (1986) and the work by Olley and Pakes (1996). The advantages of our
method are that we explicitly consider the selection process in the estimation and do not
rely on the assumption of constant returns to scale and the need to compute the user cost
of capital.
We use data on Slovenia to test whether i) exporters, on average, charge higher markups
and ii) whether markups change for ﬁrms entering and exiting export markets. Slovenia is a
particularly interesting emerging economy to study as it has been successfully transformed
from a socially planned economy to a market economy in less than a decade, reaching a level
of GDP per capita over 65 percent of the EU average by the year 2000. More speciﬁcally,
t h es a m p l ep e r i o dt h a tw ec o n s i d e ri sc h a r a c t erized by considerably productivity growth
and relative high turnover. Our methodology is therefore expected to ﬁnd signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent markups as we explicitly control for the non random exit of ﬁrms and unobserved
productivity shocks. Our results conﬁrm the importance of these controls.
Our method delivers higher estimates of ﬁrm-level markups compared to standard
techniques that cannot directly control for unobserved productivity shocks. Our estimates
are robust to various price setting models and speciﬁcations of the production function.
We ﬁnd that markups diﬀer dramatically between exporters and non exporters, and ﬁnd
signiﬁcant and robust higher markups for exporting ﬁrms. The latter is consistent with
the ﬁndings of productivity premium for exporters, but at the same time requires a better
understanding of what these (revenue based) productivity diﬀerences exactly measure. We
provide one important reason for ﬁnding higher measured revenue productivity: higher
markups. Furthermore, we estimate signiﬁcant higher markups for ﬁrms entering export
markets.
21We see these results as a ﬁrst step in opening up the productivity-export black box,
and provide a potential explanation for the big measured productivity gains that go in
hand with becoming an exporter. In this way our paper is related to the recent work of
Constantini and Melitz (forthcoming) who provide an analytic framework that generates
export entry productivity eﬀects due to ﬁrms making joint export entry-innovation choice,
where innovation leads to higher productivity.
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Figure 1: Export-Markup Dynamics in Slovenian Manufacturing.
Appendix A: Multi-Product Firm Bertrand Price Setting and Markups
Suppose as in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) that there are F ﬁrms in a speciﬁc
industries, producing diﬀerentiated products. Each ﬁrm produces a subset Γf of the J
products available on the market. To understand what our markup estimates refer to in








(pj − mcj)Msj (p,x,ξ;ϑ)
where M is the size of the market and s is market share, that depends on the price vector,
as well as observed (x) and unobserved characteristics (ξ) of the products (ϑ is the vector
of parameters to be estimated).

















where ∆rj is a JxJ matrix whose (j,r) element is deﬁned by:
∆rj =
∂sj(p,x,ξ;ϑ)
∂pj if r and j are produced by the same ﬁrm
0 otherwise
In other words, the markup is a function of the sensitivity of market share to price,
given the set of prices set by competitors, the characteristics of all products on the markets
and the characteristics of the consumers on the market.
Appendix B: Industry Markups and Export Dynamics
We report the estimated markup coeﬃcients for the various industries of the Slovenian
manufacturing sector. These coeﬃcients are obtained after running the exact same re-
gression as in Table 2 (upper panel) by industry to free up the markup parameter. This
robustness check shows that our results are not speciﬁc to certain sectors or aggregation.
Table 5: Estimated Industry Markups
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